

CANADIAN FACES OF REASON

PART III

“If one had to choose only one Canadian philosopher to be rescued from oblivion,” Armour and Trott tell us, “one could make an excellent case for John Clark Murray,” as “his *Introduction to Ethics* remains a useful place to take one’s puzzles about moral theory for review.”¹ They report that “his concern about women’s rights nearly cost him his job at McGill and his manuscript on the rights of workers and the diseases of industrial capitalism might still raise eyebrows.”² Moreover, Murray’s “forceful articles in *The Open Court* concerning Canadian independence and free trade brought these Canada-U.S. issues to the journal’s U.S. readership, concluding: “His nose for controversy and his sharp appreciation of the likely future are hardly excelled.”³

Born in Scotland on March 19, 1836, John Clark Murray was “not quite a generation younger than Paxton Young and a little more than a generation younger than James Beavan,” a generational location that “made a difference,” as “the end of the Scottish philosophy of common sense was already in sight when he was a student.”⁴ His father, David Murray,⁵ served as Provost of Paisley, providing the young Murray “the means to study,” using it - after his graduation from Edinburgh - to explore German idealism at Heidelberg and Göttingen.⁶ Armour and Trott point out that the Canada to which Murray immigrated was rather unlike the country to which Beaven and Paxton Young had immigrated.⁷ Murray arrived in Kingston, Ontario, five years before Confederation. Queen’s University was then “scarcely more than a building.”⁸ He moved to Montreal ten years later, appointed Professor of Logic and of Mental and Moral Philosophy at McGill, to remain there until his death in 1917.⁹ In Montreal, Armour and Trott continue, he observed the issues faced by industrial workers and, more broadly, the “problems of a society divided by class, by race, and by cultural outlook.”¹⁰ The authors also tell us that Murray favoured “free trade because he believed that free trade was necessary to eradicate the poverty of the world, but he was in other ways no continentalist.”¹¹ So-called “free trade” has uplifted hundreds of millions – perhaps most notably in China – during the last seventy years, and Canada remains enmeshed economically¹² in the North American continent.

Armour and Trott also tell us Murray thought that “Christianity was, quite simply, true,”¹³ that “persons are not things,” that one’s “value is not relative to a social situation” nor “limited in value by his history, his prospects, or his utility,” that each person has “basic personal rights.”¹⁴ Being a person means transcending “limitations by reason of being that which gives things their value,”¹⁵ an abstraction that became concrete¹⁶ when Murray thought about those industrial workers: “The main thing, he thinks, is to find a way to preserve the personal rights of labour.”¹⁷ Labour unions can help, but “even if [a worker] succeeds in forming a trade union, the labourer is relatively unlikely to achieve anything like a full measure of justice.”¹⁸ To “equalize wealth,”

Murray supported the concept of “co-partnership,”¹⁹ namely workers and owners and managers together operating – and profiting from - industry. A “moralist by nature and philosophic conviction,” Murray “cannot bring himself to accept the Marxist view that the legal and political process is essentially a super-structure which is really dependent on the economic sub-structure.”²⁰ Rather, Murray considers economics as “essentially bad because of lack of moral and legal restriction.”²¹ While the psychological trait of “humility” is “desirable,” economic humility not so much, as “poverty” necessitates a “chained preoccupation with material goods.”²² Nor does poverty teach anything; it is no “educational force.”²³ That is, “being hungry does not improve one’s thoughts and, like nearly all the Scottish philosophers, Murray is inclined to the view that one must *think* one’s way into the kingdom of heaven.”²⁴ Anticipating critiques of what we now call human capital theory,²⁵ Murray faults industrial capitalism because it correlates workers’ value with their economic productivity; for Murray, persons – including workers - are “ends in themselves,” deriving their worth “from a greater being, but ... givers of value in this world because it is they who form the ends around which the means must be determined.”²⁶

Recall their earlier point – that “in English Canadian philosophy reason is used as a device to explore alternatives, to suggest ways of combining apparently contradictory ideas, to discover new ways of passing from idea to another”²⁷ - Armour and Trott tell us that for Murray, “reason is always the device for co-ordinating experience, for opening new alternatives, for overcoming prejudice but never, in itself, a substitute for force, a kind of compulsion.”²⁸ No surprise, then, that for Murray “one cannot derive ‘ought’ from ‘is.’”²⁹ Armour and Trott then suggest “that reason itself does not bear mechanically on action,”³⁰ that the application of the rule to the particular case is, in part, an act of invention,” that “it, itself, involves freedom.”³¹ Without freedom there can be no morality: “And consequently, so far from restricting my freedom, it rather posits freedom as a reality in my life, because it frees me as a rational being from the tyranny of those non-rational forces which are organized in my individual human nature.”³² One of those “non-rational forces” could be pleasure.

Armour and Trott sweepingly summarize “Epicurean theories – which run from Epicurus to Mill – [as] those which locate the good in reference to some inner state, characteristically pleasure.”³³ They continue: “Stoic theories are those which locate the good by reference to reason.”³⁴ They then suggest that “Epicurean theories are in general utilitarian in that they suppose that one evaluates acts in terms of their results,” those in contrast to “Stoic theories [that] are, in the terminology most frequently used now, deontological,” as “they are theories which seek to determine those acts which are good in themselves or fundamental duties and seek to do so by identifying adequate moral rules.”³⁵ Armour and Trott report that “Murray argues against the Epicurean theories,” concluding that “they fail to do justice to the moral situation.”³⁶ The truth is that “not only do we not always seek pleasure, but we discern that acts are frequently right independently of their consequences.”³⁷ Murray is also critical of “Stoic theories,”

as “they misguidedly seek to reduce morality to mechanical obedience or to preordained rules.”³⁸

Murray construes “individuality” as “a social function,”³⁹ specifically that “the promotion of individuality and, hence, our individual freedom, is a social obligation.”⁴⁰ Armour and Trott tell us “that he rejects the doctrine that we start out as perfectly individualized social atoms” – isn’t that one in fact the concept of “individual”⁴¹ denotes? – and that “there is, then, an overriding obligation to promote the interests of the community because it is only if one has a community which is appropriately organized that one can develop individuals,” as “individuality is the result of a relation between a man and his community.”⁴² Individuality could be, in part, a consequence of community, but it also could be its cause. Murray himself seems to valorize the individual, evident in the Armour and Trott summary of Murray’s moral view: “There are two sources of value – the discernment of the ultimate worth of the individual person; and the value of rational inquiry and the attempt to put coherence on one’s life and thought.”⁴³

No instance of narcissism⁴⁴ or “possessive individualism”⁴⁵ here, as “Murray insists that self-love means the individual’s regard for his own real good,”⁴⁶ good here no straightforward, unexamined, uninspired expression of desire, but a reasoned apprehension of God.⁴⁷ “Christianity, to him,” Armour and Trott continue, “is part of the development of human thought – a crucial phase in which certain elements of human consciousness and conscience emerge,” an “amalgam of Judaism, Greek metaphysics, and the later philosophy of the Stoics.”⁴⁸ The first influence is obvious. Concerning the second influence, Armour and Trott explain: “By postulating a rational universe, the Greeks were able to portray a world in which it would become intelligible that all men were bound together by the common reason which forms a common strand in their basic humanity.”⁴⁹ Concerning the third, Armour and Trott comment: “It is this notion of natural system combined with the demand for a general humanitarianism which Murray finds to be the contribution of Stoicism to the development of Christianity.”⁵⁰

Armour and Trott then tell us that Murray “watched with little pleasure the development of government after Confederation,” knowing “about the railroad scandals,” unhappy, they add, with “the amount of bribery, corruption, self-seeking, and the blatant pursuit of party interests which were so characteristic of the first years of the new dominion.”⁵¹ Murray “would not have seen, in Canadian history, the slow unfolding of liberal principles,” nor would he “have seen in the development of Canada the thrust to build a commercial empire leading into the heartland of the continent which so fascinates Professor Creighton.”⁵² They think that “American constitutionalism with its ringing set of eternal truths and its individualist bias must have seemed inherently less flexible,”⁵³ although why anyone would think that escapes me. But then Armour and Trott supply a possible explanation, speculating that “there must have been a continuing element of nostalgia for British constitutional practice

which Canada could meet and the United States could not.”⁵⁴ Continuing their condescending inflation of the difference between Canada and the United States, they then “speculate that Murray’s interest in a morality which ultimately would transcend nationality and provide a basis for the uniform accommodation of a great variety of cultures would find a natural home in the Canadian context.”⁵⁵ My irritation subsides, however, when I read: “It therefore becomes very important that the world should be so organized as to provide a variety of alternatives in our political and moral life. There is little doubt that he saw Canada as one of these alternatives which deserved preservation.”⁵⁶ Of course Canada constitutes “one of these alternatives.”

“Would Murray have developed in just the same way had he remained in Scotland?” Armour and Trott ask, answering with resounding “No.”⁵⁷ Murray came to believe that “political principles arise out of empirical attempts to solve particular problems,” that “general principles, themselves, develop out of a history of consciousness and conscience,”⁵⁸ a view they apparently ascribe to Murray’s Canadian experience. “Thus Murray did not think that anyone was in a position to lay down a final system now or at any foreseeable time in the future,” again a view Armour and Trott ascribe to Murray’s experience of living in Canada:

The experience of living in a society which had the curious property of being both a new creation and the continuation of a set of very old traditions must have reinforced these notions. He was surely impressed by the fact that one cannot simply create an ideal society overnight. He could see both what had happened in Canada in the early years after Confederation and what had happened in the United States in the century which had elapsed since the revolution. Both perspectives convinced him that one had to work piece-meal. At the same time, his own Scottish background and his own experience of the intersecting traditions that made up Canada impressed him with the fact that there is a direction of social development and led him to believe in the real prospect for progress.⁵⁹

Armour and Trott focus on that last idea, explaining that it was not associated with Hegelian historical teleology⁶⁰: “Oddly enough, Hegel’s passionate interest in the philosophy of history did not carry over to his British emulators either in Scotland or in England,” and that “it was not until Collingwood⁶¹ that the philosophy of history became an important activity amongst British idealists,” acknowledging that “F.H. Bradley⁶², it is true, had written an essay on the philosophy of history, but it is not an essay which would encourage historians.”⁶³

While an important in philosophy in English Canada, Murray – like those who have preceded him in the Armour-Trott book – may have been as informed (i.e., subjectively structured) by his place of origin as by where he immigrated. “Perhaps the fairest conclusion,” Armour and Trott conclude, “is that Canada’s influence on Murray

was real though moderate, just as Murray's influence on Canada was real though moderate."⁶⁴ And it turns out that the "place in which his influence on Canada was strongest" was not philosophy but "the organization of higher education," specifically "the issue of the education of women."⁶⁵ In "both in the senate of McGill and the public forum of the university, he spoke out for effective co-education," and "such previously unheard-of outbursts disturbed the peaceful atmosphere of conservative McGill, and the suggestion of women in the same classes and courses as men made Murray an object of scorn in the eyes of his peers and colleagues."⁶⁶ But as far as Murray was concerned, "there is no better gauge of the state of civilization in a society ... than the position which it assigns to women," and at McGill, "there was room for improvement."⁶⁷ The status of women in society plus the relation of capital and labour were, for Murray, "the two great social problems of our time."⁶⁸ Armour and Trott then align his political concerns with his philosophical reasoning, asserting that "Murray's views about the education of women are a microcosm of his views about applied moral philosophy generally."⁶⁹ Again uncritically reflecting the English Canadian nationalism of their era, Armour and Trott observe snidely: "Long before the Supreme Court of the United States grasped the point, Murray realized that in educational matters the attempt to provide facilities which were separate but equal was doomed to failure."⁷⁰

Their substantive point – that Murray's politics followed his philosophy – is that for Murray: "Among the fundamental rights of humanity is the right to physical existence and therefore the right to the means by which that existence is maintained."⁷¹ Epistemologically, "Murray has in mind a dialectical relation between experience and conceptual truth."⁷² Armour and Trott then back up (as it were), explaining that "the distinction between *theories* of truth and *theories* of knowledge is this: Theories of truth specify a standard to be met."⁷³ What are called "correspondence theories specify that the standard is a certain relation between a proposition and a state of affairs or a set of facts," while "coherence theories specify that the standard is a certain relation."⁷⁴ And "pragmatic theories specify that the standard is a certain relation between a proposition and the state of mind of one who believes it," the "ideal observer theories specify[ing] that the standard, ultimately, lies in a comparison of claims to truth with what the idea observer would report."⁷⁵ In contrast, "theories of knowledge ... generally specify a methodology."⁷⁶ They define "rationalism" as the "doctrine that knowledge is acquired by the perspicacious use of reason," and "empiricism is the doctrine that knowledge results from appropriate attention to sensory data," concluding: "In these terms, Murray is supposing both a theory of truth and a theory of knowledge."⁷⁷

The "consequence," we are told, of "putting his two theories together is that both turn out to be a certain state of consciousness."⁷⁸ That "for Murray, both truth and knowledge are states of consciousness" enables Armour and Trott to characterize Murray as an "idealist."⁷⁹ To my understanding Armour and Trott overstate the case when they summarize idealism as saying: "We cannot get outside, not because there is

some special limit to human knowledge or because the human mind is deficient for its task, but because, after all, there is no ‘outside.’”⁸⁰ Then they tell us that “Murray has rejected subjective idealism” (to my mind what they’ve just described), but he has also rejected “materialism on the ground that no mechanical model will suffice to explain our mental life either.”⁸¹ Not rooted in our minds nor in the material world, Murray points out “that the categories by which we structure our experience and the general ideas which govern the basic features of our lives must have their own origins,”⁸² those “origins” are not necessarily in “the present,” as our consciousness of time is that it requires an awareness of something other than the present.”⁸³ That conclusion does not move Murray into the past or the future but into timelessness: “What this means is that for knowledge to be possible at all there must be something which is outside time and that something must be a portion of our personal self-awareness, a feature of our continuing cognition,” Murray’s “argument, ultimately, [being] that no experience would be possible at all if there were not this fundamental basis for it.”⁸⁴ What others might term as eternity Murray regards as “objective time,” meaning “that there should be an *order* of events which is ultimately intelligible.”⁸⁵ He seems to be proceeding more logically than phenomenologically, or so it appears in the Armour-Trott interpretation: “There always, in short, have to be reference points on which our explanations can catch hold.”⁸⁶

“Murray’s position is quite strongly Kantian,”⁸⁷ Armour and Trott assert, explaining that: “Like Kant, he supposes that the human mind arranges things in such a way as to make an intelligible world.”⁸⁸ I wonder how “strongly Kantian” Murray’s position can be when Armour and Trott then tell us: “But, unlike Kant, he does not surmise from this that there must be a world which is independent of consciousness and which is close to us by reason of the very fact that our minds arrange things in their own peculiar pattern.”⁸⁹ Maybe not “a world” that is “independent of consciousness” but a “God” who, Armour and Trott tell us, “exists, that is, in *relation to* the consciousness of the believer,”⁹⁰ that phrase “in relation to” implying (at least to me) that one’s relationship to God – structuring one’s consciousness – enables the revelation that is our apprehension of the world, simultaneously subjective and objective, a distinction, we will learn momentarily, Murray evidently declined to make. Actually, Armour and Trott tell us that Murray thought “that neither subjective self-consciousness nor the objective world – what he calls the “notself” – is absolute in itself,” meaning that “both, therefore, are only relatively real,”⁹¹ as apprehension of both – again I could be mistaken here – depends on the state of one’s consciousness. “Both, ultimately, are aspects of the same unity rather than sharply differentiated entities.”⁹²

Given his self-identity as a Christian, I supposed that “unity” must be (for him) God, But Armour and Trott tell us it is reason, that the extent to which we can have knowledge of it, the external world is an intelligible order which is the concrete manifestation of reason” as “it thus cannot be thought of without thinking, as well, of

the intellect which embodies it.”⁹³ They write that “to think about nature is to think about the intelligible order which derives, not from any particular mind, but from the notion of rationality itself,”⁹⁴ an odd sentence to me as “reason” and “rationality” can be (or at least seem) quite disembodied. “Equally,” they continue, “the self as consciousness is not conceivable apart from the external world,” which is to say that “to have a consciousness is to have an object of cognition,”⁹⁵ a point reiterated by Jean-Paul Sartre seventeen years after Murray’s death.⁹⁶ To Armour and Trott, Murray’s position is “inherently dialectical,”⁹⁷ a position to which Sartre would also later move.⁹⁸ But the line Armour and Trott quote – that space is “a relation of mutual outness; the very idea of spaces implies that every space has something outside of it”⁹⁹ – seems more spiritual than dialectical. As Huebner notes: “This going beyond, this ‘moreness’ of life, this transcendental dimension, is the usual meaning of ‘spirit’ and ‘spiritual.’”¹⁰⁰ True, the concepts (and experience of) “outness” and “moreness” are different from each other – the former emphasizing space, the latter pointing to space plus time, even reality itself – but they seem to me to converge conceptually.

Armour and Trott focus not “this transcendental dimension” but instead on epistemology, telling us that Murray wants to “show both that space and time are not purely objective entities to themselves and [that] he wants to show that this is no reason for adopting the Kantian distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal worlds – the distinction between the world of experience and the world as it really is,” but rather “that space and time are relations and that they require the activity of cognizing intelligence.”¹⁰¹ That sentence seems to risk subjectivism¹⁰² even when Armour and Trott “put it another way,” writing that “when we construct models of physical space-time and come to regard sensations as representing interconnected parts of them, we are representing not so much the physical world as a property of our own cognitions,” retreating from sheer subjectivism when they then return again to that “unity” (God?) they asserted earlier, quoting Murray: “We are aware of this ‘presence in consciousness of a permanent factor’.”¹⁰³ Yes, “Murray thinks, always, that there is a real and objective world – that there is a real space, a real time, and that it is filled with real objects,” but Murray also “thinks that the nature of this real world is that it is the objectification of rational intelligence,”¹⁰⁴ leaving me to wonder if “reason” not God is for Murray “that permanent factor in consciousness.” That would seem to be confirmed when Armour and Trott write that Murray thinks “there is a basic and fundamental intelligence in the world.”¹⁰⁵ Maybe Murray thought reason was God’s manifestation, then this apparent idolatry is avoided.

Next turn to Murray’s “distinction between those issues which he thought pertained to psychology and those which he claimed belonged to ‘more general’ philosophical inquiries,”¹⁰⁶ implying that psychology is a subset of philosophy. Armour and Trott also consider psychology as proper to philosophical inquiry, calling it “a continuing sub-theme of Canadian philosophy almost from the beginning, to near-contemporary writers like George Brett, whose massive history of psychology will be

discussed in a later chapter.”¹⁰⁷ Sub-theme becomes a separate theme during the twentieth century, as psychology separates from philosophy, from the humanities generally, a development perhaps Murray anticipated as it is rejected in the last chapter of Murray’s *An Introduction to Psychology* where Murray argues that the “problem of volition – the problem, if you like, of ‘free will’ – is a central feature,” and that “it can only be understood through a combination of philosophical analysis and an examination of the psychological facts,” thereby “essentially denying the possibility of a final division of philosophy and psychology.”¹⁰⁸ This issue of volition – of will – Armour and Trott consider “quite real one in our own time,” as “it may be one of the crucial issues in our faltering search for an understanding of the human predicament.”¹⁰⁹

“What he is going to suggest,” Armour and Trott tell us, “is that an understanding of the free will problem depends, primarily, upon the attainment of an adequate theory about the general nature of knowledge, its structure, and its objects,”¹¹⁰ thereby casting the study of volition as fundamentally epistemological. “He would certainly conceive that we always act against the background of emotion,” Armour and Trott continue, “and that that background establishes the effective limits of action.”¹¹¹ An important part of this “background,” what Murray characterizes as (quoting Murray here) “the chronic, probably organic, condition which forms in personal character or a predominant tendency to certain forms of emotional excitement.”¹¹² That insight would seem to anticipate Freud, this “background” – the unconscious?¹¹³ – “so much a part of us that it becomes difficult even for us to bring it to consciousness.”¹¹⁴ Armour and Trott see this background “in the overall pattern of our lives,” but what Murray (again, quoting him) terms “temperament or disposition,”¹¹⁵ a rather different concept it seems to be, as “temperament or disposition” is not necessarily visible, as an “overall pattern” probably is.

That rejection of psychology’s separation from philosophy noted above did not remain, as “Murray would not only concede that there can be and ought to be a ‘scientific psychology,’ he would also concede that any reasonable understanding of volition or free will must take account of this fact.”¹¹⁶ But he (to my mind) waffles, arguing “it is *because* there is a possibility of a scientific psychology that one needs to postulate free will,” that “we only grasp the origin of our feelings and sensations, the explanation of our acts in psychological laws, and the relation of our subjective impressions to an objective reality because we are, obviously, able to stand back, compare, and reflect.”¹¹⁷ Those would seem to be scientific acts, but Murray skirts that potential problem by invoking what we might term today positionality: “To the outward observer, what seems capable of explanation is mechanical and law-like,” but “to the inner eye it is different.”¹¹⁸ While “within the system the ‘scientific’ psychologist constructs, everything appears to have its place in a law-like sequence of events,” but “when the psychologist reflects upon his practice, he comes to grasp the other perspective,” realizing “that he, himself, must be outside the system he constructs just

for the person that he could not, otherwise, construct it.”¹¹⁹ Again we are returned to epistemology. “Murray generally associates reason with intelligibility,” Armour and Trott assert.¹²⁰ I would have thought reason enables intelligibility, a more specific relation between the two that Armour and Trott then seem to confirm when they write that, for Murray, “reason is capable of development,”¹²¹ a potential upon which the very possibility of education rests.

Working my way through the Armour and Trott volume I am reminded of one of my motives for the Curriculum Studies in Canada Project. Recall from the rationale: “The CSinC Project is being undertaken in an era when the contours of Canadian identities are being challenged by Canada’s unique realities, among them ongoing efforts at justice for aboriginal peoples, the continuing influx of immigrants and refugees, and the complex relationship with the United States.” Add to the Indigenous challenge to the field – in part political but also epistemological – the ongoing arrival of immigrants and refugees who may not know the intellectual history of the place where they now find themselves, and that now ancient but ongoing ambivalence toward the United States - add to these facts, these conditions of contemporary (academic) life in Canada, the presentism made more pervasive by advanced capitalism and its intensifying technologization, and I am left with what feels like almost an imperative to provide a resource for those who study and teach curriculum studies in university faculties of education to consult, to help students and faculty to situate the emergency of the present in the past. So doing can only help us refine our focus as it situates our scholarship, enabling our attunement to what we are called to study and teach in this place and at this time.

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ENDNOTES

¹ 1981, 105.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid. Even so, Murray (Ibid.) professed himself “an ardent admirer” of Sir William Hamilton: <http://www.scottishphilosophy.org/philosophers/sir-william-hamilton/>

⁵ <https://archive.org/details/memoirofdavidmur00murrsoft>

⁶ 1981, 106.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ 1981, 107. For Kant, trade promised “perpetual peace,” as I acknowledge: Pinar 2009, 169, n. 8.

¹² <https://www.trade.gov/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta>

¹³ 1981, 107.

¹⁴ 1981, 108.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ The two concepts are also an issue in curriculum theory: Pinar 1994 (1979).

¹⁷ 1981, 109.

¹⁸ 1981, 110.

¹⁹ 1981, 113.

²⁰ 1981, 116.

²¹ Ibid.

²² 1981, 118.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ See Moghtader 2023.

²⁶ 1981, 119.

²⁷ 1981, 4; see research brief #105.

²⁸ 1981, 119-120.

²⁹ 1981, 120.

³⁰ Aoki (2005 [1987], 154) makes a somewhat similar critique: “Hence, applying is reproducing something general in a concrete situation. This reproductive view of application embraces the view that application is separated from understanding, and, in fact, follows it. It is an instrumental view.”

³¹ 1981, 121.

³² Murray, quoted in 1981, 121.

³³ 1981, 122.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ 1981, 124.

⁴¹ The term’s origin is evidently late Middle English (in the sense ‘indivisible’): from medieval Latin *individualis*, from Latin *individuus*, from in- ‘not’ + *dividuus* ‘divisible’ (from *dividere* ‘to divide’).

https://search.yahoo.com/yhs/search?hspart=tro&hsimp=yhs-freshy&grd=1&type=Y219_F163_204671_071321&p=define%3A+individual

Not only etymologically but historically is the term crucial: see, for example, Siedentop 2014.

⁴² 1981, 124.

⁴³ 1981, 127.

⁴⁴ Lasch 1978.

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<https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100124539> See research brief #104.

⁴⁶ 1981, 128.

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- 47 A loving God at that, as for Murray “Christianity [is] love” (ibid.)
- 48 Ibid. Armour and Trott add: “Perhaps his only eccentricity is the weight which he is inclined to place on Stoicism” (ibid).
- 49 1981, 129.
- 50 Ibid.
- 51 1981, 130.
- 52 Ibid. A rather patronizing verb, no?
<https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/donald-creighton>
- 53 1981, 131.
- 54 Ibid.
- 55 Ibid.
- 56 Ibid.
- 57 Ibid.
- 58 1981, 132.
- 59 Ibid. Certainly the U.S. Civil War was a catastrophe that could shake anyone’s faith in the country, but shaken that faith did not remain, at least not in America, although Trump’s triumph challenged it once again.
- 60 <http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1569/the-telos-of-history-as-understood-by-hegel#:~:text=That%20is%2C%20to%20him%2C%20history%20is%20the%20conceptual,is%20only%20natural%20that%20history%20follows%20suit.%205>
- 61 <https://www.britannica.com/biography/R-G-Collingwood> My conception of reactivating the past intersects with what Collingwood suggests in *The Idea of History* (1946).
- 62 <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bradley/>
- 63 1981, 133.
- 64 Ibid.
- 65 Ibid.
- 66 Ibid.
- 67 1981, 134.
- 68 Ibid.
- 69 1981, 137.
- 70 1981, 138. Of course, like Murray, there were many U.S. activists – abolitionists and feminists – who contested the concept of “separate but equal” long before it was made illegal. Moreover, “separate but unequal” still obtains in Canada as far as immigrants are concerned: <https://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/article/separate-but-unequal-immigration-detention-in-canada-and-the-great-writ-of-liberty/> Moreover, in Murray’s era separate but unequal - clearly in force at McGill (as noted in the main text) – but across Canada. According to Wikipedia: “Until 1965, racial segregation in schools, stores and most aspects of public life existed legally in Ontario, Quebec, and Nova Scotia, and informally in other provinces such as British Columbia. Unlike

in the United States, **racial segregation in Canada** applied to all non-whites and was historically enforced through laws, court decisions and social norms with a closed immigration system that barred virtually all non-whites from immigrating until 1962.” And Indigenous peoples in Canada “were treated in racially segregated hospitals called Indian hospitals or segregated wards in regular hospitals. Medical experimentation also occurred at these hospitals, frequently without consent, such as the testing of BCG vaccine on infants. These hospitals were underfunded, overcrowded, and had worse quality of care for patients. Hospitals that exclusively treated white patients were often located nearby.”https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Racial_segregation_in_Canada For more, see: <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/racial-segregation-of-black-people-in-canada>

⁷¹ 1981, 134.

⁷² 1981, 144.

⁷³ 1981, 145.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid. I implied not a conflation, as Trott and Armour are suggesting that Murray made, but rather an association in my chapter in Pinar 1974.

⁷⁹ 1981, 146. For more see: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/> While that entry locates idealism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there are also more recent instances of it: see Markus and Zizek 2009.

⁸⁰ Ibid. There are of course varieties of philosophical idealism, but what Armour and Trott have just written – that there is no “outside” – seems a version of so-called subjective idealism which, in next sentence, they will tell us Murray rejected. That means there is an “outside” but its apprehension is contingent, in part, upon one’s state of consciousness.

⁸¹ 1981, 152.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ 1981, 153.

⁸⁴ 1981, 154.

⁸⁵ Ibid. Since human beings are conscious of, immersed in, time, how can what exists “outside” time – in Murray’s mind “objective time – be apprehended? Through heightened consciousness?

⁸⁶ 1981, 156. If our “explanations” are of the natural world, why wouldn’t the natural world be our reference, as in scientific inquiry, although admittedly science is an elaborate set of mental schema that enables explanation (and apprehension), that suggested (in)famously (and with much more conceptual sophistication than I

showing here) by Bruno Latour: <https://www.science.org/content/article/bruno-latour-veteran-science-wars-has-new-mission>

87 Ibid.

88 1981, 157.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid. My Dad, who was for a while also my Sunday-school teacher, confided to me (in reply to my question, posed while walking back home from church, did he think the Bible was literally true) that human language, human comprehension, indeed human existence, was more a function of the human condition (itself historically and culturally variable, and in terms of consciousness too as some of us apprehend and understand more than others) than it is a communiqué issued by God.

91 1981, 158.

92 1981, 159.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid.

96 <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/philosophy-of-sartre/intentionality/B6DF7B68A14CB2BC54E1EE7E01F9AD4A#:~:text=The%20claim%20that%20all%20consciousness%20is%20consciousness%20of,is%20perceived;%20in%20desire,%20at%20what%20is%20desired>

97 1981, 159.

98 <https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28085/chapter-abstract/212147661?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=false>

99 Quoted in in 1981, 160.

100 1999, 344.

101 1981, 162.

102 <https://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/introduction/subjectivism.shtml>

103 1981, 167. The Murray line is quoted on this page.

104 1981, 168.

105 1981, 169.

106 1981, 170. Dewey, too, considered psychology a proper topic for philosophers, especially early on: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey/>

107 Ibid.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid. For George Grant, too, “will” was a problem, especially when materialized as technology: see Pinar 2019, 99.

110 1981, 171.

111 1981, 172.

112 Quoted in 1981, 172.

113 <https://www.freud.org.uk/education/resources/what-is-the-unconscious/>

114 1981, 172.

¹¹⁵ Quoted in 1981, 172.

¹¹⁶ 1981, 172.

¹¹⁷ 1981, 173.

¹¹⁸ 1981, 174.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ 1981, 175.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*