CANADIAN FACES OF REASON
PART V

"When John Watson came to Queen's in 1872," Armour and Trott begin, "he was twenty-five years old," and "Queen's University (only six years older than Watson) was a clearing in the woods by the lake."[1] On the philosophy faculty already was the "remarkable" John Clark Murray.[2] The "fulsome praise which Edward Caird had lavished on the young Watson in his letters of recommendation must have aroused a certain amount of scepticism in Kingston," Armour and Trott continue, "but Caird's estimates turned out to be true."[3] Watson went on to become a Gifford lecturer - the "highest honour which can befall a philosopher in the English-speaking world" - and was later "matched against Josiah Royce in a famous series of lectures at Berkeley."[4] Caird remained impressed, writing of Watson years later: "I do not know anyone who sees his way more clearly through any philosophical entanglements."[5] Watson would, in Amour and Trott's judgement, "exercise an important influence" on Canada, as his students at Queen's, after graduation, took up posts in the "growing civil service, Presbyterian churches across the country, and the newer universities in the west."[6] They continue:

> For more than fifty years, Watson was the dominant – sometimes *the* dominant influence – at Queen's. He played a significant role in the intellectual background and even in some of the practical negotiations which led to the United Church of Canada. His pupils seem to have carried with them an echo of that dry voice and its persistent demand for reasonableness and it often stayed with them for life.[7]

While philosophy appears to have predominated in Canada's late nineteenth and early twentieth intellectual life, surely it is the STEM subjects that dominate now, in the school and university curriculum, and in Canada's national life.

Watson may have influenced Canada, but, Armour and Trott point out, "Canada also influenced Watson," despite the fact that "he was and remained a devotee of a particular kind of philosophical idealism," and "the form which it took was significantly different from the form it had found in Germany, in England, in Scotland, and in the United States."[8] Amour and Trott characterize his book, *The State in Peace and War*, as a "plea for the application of the British North America Act to the government of the world,"[9] an affirmation of Canada I suppose, Canada as a country modelled on Great Britain.[10] Influenced by the "notion of a traditionalist society," Watson regarded "politics as a slow development of the interplay of reason and experience – something not subject to simple, immediate, final solutions but, nonetheless, subject continuously to the application of reason," and that view, Armour

and Trott suggest, "is the basis of a kind of pluralist federalism which has obvious roots in the Canadian experience."[11] In addition to his "constant communitarian outlook" – Armour and Trott emphasize its "evident connections with the Canadian situation" – Watson's "rational religion almost became the creed of the United Church."[12]

Living in Canada may have influenced Watson but apparently Canada's philosophers did not, as Armour and Trott think "there is comparatively little reason to think that – apart from his contact with John Clark Murray – Watson was directly influenced in a significant way by earlier philosophy in Canada," and that despite their view that "his life, for the most part, was the life of the mind,"[13] a phrase not much now in circulation, certainly not in curriculum studies.[14] Summarizing, Armour and Trott tell us that Watson composed a "number of introductory surveys, major commentaries on Kant, briefer historical analyses of Comte, Mill, and Spencer, a book on political philosophy, and several works – one of them running to two volumes – on rational religion."[15] Indeed, Watson wrote "constantly, and at the time of his death, in 1939, left unfinished work in philosophical psychology" and "beyond all that, the archives at Queen's are bulging with his notes and letters."[16] The "philosophical tradition which Watson inherited had its roots in Kant and Hegel but it came through Edward Caird who, in turn, had been a close friend of Thomas Hill Green."[17] And "Green had been strongly influenced by Hegel's outlook on metaphysics, morals, and politics."[18]

Armour and Trott inform us that Green had found Hegel "obscure,"[19] Hegel's "arguments frequently less than compelling when he subjected them to the best analysis he could," forcing him, Armour and Trott continue, "to work out the problem largely on his own," prompting Armour and Trott to conclude that although "British idealism is frequently described as 'Hegelian,' the expression refers more to a general outlook than to any specific line of argument."[20] Green also had "strong interests in education and in political reform, as "he was appalled by the class bias in British education and by the underlying rampant individualism which he saw as the basis of a society which seemed largely incapable of taking a satisfactory view of itself as a single community."[21] Green discerned in the philosophy of John Stuart Mill "the combination of this individualism with the essentially self-referring ethic of pleasure,"[22] adding that: "For all the protestations of Bentham and Mill about 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number,' Green, and after him Bradley and Bosanquet, saw in this the notion of an aggregation which could never be satisfactorily carried out."[23]

In addition to "looking for a different view of selfhood,"[24] Green was preoccupied "with the problem of freedom."[25] While "Mill had conceived freedom essentially negatively," Hegel's espousal of "positive freedom … was difficult to grasp and, what is more, entangled with Hegel's philosophy of history – a philosophy of history which seemed to entail that the course of human events was, at least in the larger sense, determined by the nature of things."[26] We are told that Green was less

interested in "that notion" than in "Hegel's view that, paradoxically enough, it is the structure of law which does give freedom,"[27] asserting:

> Men are free not just because laws obstruct interference with their acts but, much more seriously, because the framework of law provides positive opportunity not merely for those activities which form a part of "civil society" (the domain of public institutions, contracts, corporations, and so on) but, ultimately, for the kind of self-identity which derives from having a place in society and the opportunity for self-development to fill that place.[28]

As we will soon see, Watson will relocate freedom within selfhood, combining selfhood and freedom – a relation.

For now, however, Armour and Trott stay with Green, who had evidently concluded that "Hume's error lay in the problem of relations,"[29] concluding that it is "at this point" Hume's philosophy "breaks down."[30] And it won't do, Green thought, "to simply reinstitute Locke's 'something I know not what' – the underlying substance – to hold the bits and pieces of experience together."[31] The way out, Green came to think, was to emphasize "mind," as "it is mind which does the relating," meaning that: "Relation is an activity and not another kind of thing."[32] With that premise in mind, Green construed "knowledge … [as] a matter of ordering experience correctly," and "the normal standard for this is the coherence which leads to a rational order."[33] This idea provides the "basis of Green's view that reality itself is the exhibition of an ultimate consciousness."[34] B

Exhibition seems to me an odd if interesting word choice, as the term typically refers to a public display of art, or, in social terms, behavior designed to draw attention to oneself. Locating "reality" in only or even primarily in what is observable – ah, science – ignores the soul (recall that term "ultimate consciousness") and subjective interiority. And I thought Green was an idealist. In their account, Armour and Trott don't seem to notice the trouble their word choice creates, focusing instead on Green's theory of the human self that – unlike an artwork in a museum - is "something which develops over time as, in the process of becoming conscious of its relations to sensations,"[35] "something" being another odd word choice (although consistent with the art being exhibited), as the self is, for Idealists, not a thing. Being a "process," we are unsurprised to learn that the self is "something that it gradually frees itself from the dominance of those sensations and, as it gradually understands its relation to its own desires, is capable of freeing itself from those desires," by means of which the "self thus comes to recognize itself."[36] Armour and Trott focus not on self-recognition but on freedom, "something which grows upon it [the self] in a process,"[37] and that fact "guarantees that freedom cannot be obtained merely by removing occasions of interference,"[38] that "freedom must, rather be the outcome of a deliberate process of growth,"[39] that last term anticipating the twentieth-century interest (if not obsession) with "growth," psychological, cognitive, economic, and of course a term near-and-dear to educators.[40] Green's theory, Armour and Trott continue, "runs dramatically into

conflict with each element of the theories of philosophers like Mill," asserting instead that "self-realization is not a matter of accumulating pleasures."[41] Instead, "self-realization" (would Green have used that term?) "is a matter of developing an inner coherence in the course of matching the rational order of the world,"[42] a phrasing that risks (in social terms) conformity, and contradicts the uniqueness of art objects (implied in their use of the term "exhibition.") While no one if us may be "perfectly individuated," and while "everyone draws upon a common universal consciousness," individuation would seem to be the point (at least in the Armour-Trott treatment of Green's theory), as "freedom is the outcome of self-realization."[43]

Armour and Trott Green's "views were developed but not substantially changed in the philosophy of Edward Caird to which Watson was directly exposed."[44] They tell us that "in England, idealist doctrine underwent considerable development in the philosophy of Bernard Bosanquet," and "it underwent a dramatic transformation in the hands of F.H. Bradley," as "the cautious balance of reason and experience developed by Green, Bradley substituted for an all-out attack on the experienced world in the name of reason," as they were arguing "for an underlying unity of mind by means of an attack on the notion of relation itself."[45] Asserting "that the concept of relation was not itself intelligible" enabled Bradley to claim that "a world without relations must be a unity," a truth that "becomes intelligible only through the notion of an ultimate mind which becomes fragmented in our experience of it." [46] Within the terms of the Armour-Trott treatment of these ideas, it's not obvious why that claim completely contradicts Green's emphasis upon "relation," as attuning oneself to "an ultimate mind" seems as if it could be reasonably depicted as an ongoing relation – religious believers would say – to God.

"Politically, in England, the theory moved from the reformist doctrines of Green to the rather more conservative position of Bosanquet and what amounts to the studied indifference to politics exhibited by Bradley," that in contrast to Scotland where, Armour and Trott tell us, "the idealist theorists remained reformists," several, like D.G. Ritchie, becoming, "in effect, socialists."[47] Their point is that "it was in its reformist mood that Watson met the theory and, against his Free Church background, found it attractive."[48] As did other "British idealists, Watson believed that morals, politics and metaphysics were intimately related."[49] As is, apparently, the self, as Armour and Trott point out (after quoting a long Watson passage on p. 223), "that there is no sense of F.H. Bradley's view that apparent selfhood is a kind of illusion," nor "is there any sense of Bernard Bosanquet's view that there is a final primacy to the community."[50] For Watson, they continue, "the two are seen as evenly balanced," an assertion they immediately qualify by asserting that "self-identity" occurs "through the gradual individuation of myself against the background of a society," a process that "involves a complex series of influences and involves me in the continuous belief that there is a rational order to a world in which I live and have my being."[51] Armour and Trott continue: "The fact that I can see that I *am* an individual and that my individuality

depends upon the community and upon nature is, for Watson, a powerful reason for believing that a rational order does run through nature." [52] Anticipating (or precipitating?) the distinction between the pre-conceptual and the conceptual in phenomenology,[53] Watson appreciated that "experience depends on reason for its articulation."[54] Contradicting their use of "depends" (earlier in this paragraph), Armour and Trott reiterate that "the community's life is important but its meaning lies not in itself but in individuation," that, in fact, the "importance of the community is to be found in the individual, and the community is to be, as much as possible, shaped by rational deliberation."[55]

　　While Watson believes that what he calls "the three great … spheres" – nature, mind, and God – are ultimately "related,"[56] Armour and Trott tell us that "he cannot finally isolate a universal consciousness or something like Schurman's divine Prius from the process of the world," that "he must try to set limits to the interpretation of the theory of evolution so as to permit knowledge and objective values."[57] Watson is "continually seeking to relate experience to his rational framework," calling "attention to curiosity,"[58] less to emphasize "the experience of being curious," and more to point to "the order which must hold between experiences if curiosity is to be possible."[59] Without that "order," Watson thought, "so long as one lives only with the immediacies of experience, one cannot be said to have knowledge."[60] Moreover, he thought that "knowledge consists not of the action of classifying – a machine might do that and machines do order things – but, rather, of the understanding that what I am confronted with belongs to the order to which I have assigned it."[61] That "order" is not "God," Armour and Trott tell us, "order but a structural feature of that order itself."[62] Reason, too, Watson thought was "built into the very nature of reality."[63] In fact, "it would not be going too far to say that for Watson reason *is* reality."[64]

　　Unsurprisingly, then, "Watson thinks Cartesianism literally inconceivable,"[65] skeptical of abstractions such as "pure mind" or "vital force," or "indeed of anything of a factual kind which would lie outside the domain of scientific investigation."[66] Like the nomological laws associated with natural science, "mind, conceived of as the rational order in things, is, in itself, perfectly general," not the property of one person "but to everyone,"[67] leading Watson to conclude "selfishness is a kind of myopia."[68] While "evolutionary theory may well explain how one gets individuated organisms," but "it does not explain how one gets the individuation of consciousness." [69] Consciousness, Armour and Trott continue, Watson defined as "the awareness of the order in things, and, as such, it is a common property which we all share," but "it comes to be individuated because what one is conscious of is not merely the rational order but the data through which that order manifests itself," as "one cannot have one without the other."[70] To become conscious of "the data through that order manifests itself" would require, I should think, consciousness of one's (increasingly? as and if one becomes more individuated) unique "apparatus" of apprehension, its capacity for discerning data and its ability to comprehend patterns, making meaning from them.

Watson, at least in the Armour-Trott treatment, focuses not on that point – a crucial one for educators, suggestive as it of terms like "growth" and "development" – but on the resulting "tension in human affairs, a basic instability in the relation of individual to community."[71] Apparently echoing Kant's categorical imperative,[72] Watson defined "morality" as "the process of finding out not what is good for me or good for you but what is good in general," as "morality represents the claim of the ultimate consciousness."[73] But then he appears to hedge his bets, as Armour and Trott then tell us that Watson appreciated that the "rational order of things must be made manifest through the individual"[74] - my point precisely. Watson stays with that fact – and/or its implications – for long, writing: "Learning that his true nature can be realized only by self-identification with the common weal, the individual man is not externally acted upon by a foreign influence. In submitting himself to the law of reason he is submitting himself to his true self, and such submission is true freedom."[75]

Not only does Watson here appear to contradict his earlier acknowledgement that the "rational order of things must be made manifest through the individual," he appears to ignore (or is it Armour and Trott who ignore) that term "submission," when Armour and Trott substitute for it "interdependence," writing that "the continuous theme of Watson's political theory is that the individual and his society are related to one another in a way which makes for mutual interdependence."[76] Like God one might say, "society exhibits itself through the functioning differentiation of individuals."[77] Indeed, Armour and Trott continue, "the importance of the individual stems from the fact that, in the total relation, he is different from every other individual and that his value is his own."[78] And reversing that use of "depends" above, for Watson "the duty of society is to treat him in such a way as to make possible the development of his appropriate individuation." [79] In fact, "as the ultimate object of society is the development of the best life, each individual must recognize the rights of his neighbour to as free development."[80] Armour and Trott quote Watson: "The State, we may say, is under obligation to secure to the individual his rights, and any State which fails to do so ceases to fulfil its essential function."[81] They note that in this view "Watson [has] set himself against … the individualism of Mill and Spencer, … against the contractualism of Rousseau and Kant, and the theory of state supremacy which appears both overtly and latently in Plato's writings."[82]

Returning to the rational order – a conceptual secularization of God? – that presumably underlies everything and our cognitive capacity to discern it, to attune ourselves to it, Armour and Trott say that: "In general, the point from Plato to Treitschke is that the limitations on the availability of reason at a given historical time are substantially the restrictions which limits the available of experience in general."[83] For Watson, the point is not that "whatever is happening now is right because we could hardly have done anything else."[84] The point is that "we must not expect to be able to solve all our social, political, and constitutional problems instantly because we may or may not have developed the regions of experience which would provide the basis for

the discovery of the rational order which we require for a solution."[85] This realization is no "excuse for doing nothing," but "it does signify the need to make certain that the power in society is not concentrated in any one institution – even the state."[86] Moreover, "it justifies concentrating on those matters which we are able to understand clearly and it justifies the creation of constitutional devices which are designed to see to it that the governing mechanisms in a given society are responsive to new kinds of experience and to the development of reason over wider areas."[87] And "finally, it reminds us that our political institutions must always look to the future and that we must be suspicious of whatever collection of ideas happens to be available to us now."[88] This seems an argument for political even cultural progressivism – for what I have in the past termed "subjective and social reconstruction,"[89] and have more recently termed "conservatism"[90] – although I'd alter it slightly; I'd add the past "to the future" in the Watson sentence, and drop "always," as fluidity and dexterity require not freezing (as "always" implies) one's subjective and social positioning.

Interestingly, "Watson thinks that few developed philosophical theories are simply false," that (for example) "even Treitschke notices things which are important even though he distorts them."[91] Unsurprisingly – given Watson's certainty that a rational order underlies reality – he asserts that "each theory is correct insofar as it contains elements of rationality and incorrect insofar as it generalizes these elements to cover kinds of order for which those elements of rationality do not hold,"[92] apparently unaware that (or unmoved by the fact that) culture informs (although does not necessarily determine) reason. And recalling (in the paragraph preceding) Watson's disinclination to respect history – that the past remains present and foreshadows the future - as Armour and Trott tell us that "the deficiency of Plato's theory is, in Watson's view, first of all that there is an absence of reference to rights in his account of justice."[93] Moreover, "Plato conceives of reason as something which must be grasped by the few and applied to the many" – anticipating Treitschke's affirmation of authoritarianism – as "for most of its citizens, there is no inner counterpart to the outward order," a conclusion that means for Watson that Plato's "scheme ultimately fails."[94] I wonder what Watson would say in the face of fascists or terrorists: would "rights" be paramount?[95] Perhaps he would, in those circumstances, then shift his stance, as Armour and Trott tell us that: "Finally, Plato makes what Watson generally thinks to be the greatest blunder of political theorists,"[96] quoting Watson: "Plato forgets, or does not realise, that the State cannot be stereotyped for all time, but must necessarily grow with the growth of men's insight."[97] In the fact of climate crisis, conservatism – as in conservationism – is now, I argue, the face of progressivism.

"Aristotle provides important correctives to Plato's theory," Armour and Trott continue, as "Aristotle understands that man is basically a political animal, that politics is something to be understood in itself and not merely on the model of the household, and that the problem of politics is really to bind men together in a 'free and orderly community'."[98] For Aristotle, a man "should govern himself, and secondly, that he

should govern himself under obedience to law."[99] From "this notion of the general, rational law, binding on all men, which Watson sees as the basis of Stoic political theory."[100] The "theory behind the Roman law," Stoicism "generalize[d] effectively the political process from the confines of the city-state to the world as a whole," implying that "what is reasonable for one man is reasonable for all men," concluding that: "The law which binds one must, therefore, bind all."[101] Armour and Trott tell us that Watson found "this Stoic concept of the world-state was too vague,"[102] as it proved "powerless to serve as a permanent ideal of mankind." [103] Moreover, "it lacks relevance to immediate pressing problems."[104] That last point proved crucial; for Watson "reason is compelling only when it attaches us to the concrete situation."[105]

Watson worried that the nation-state could function to force "all men into faceless conformity," or – he hoped - it could be a "kind of organic whole which is viable because it really does provide for the completest range of human potential which is consistent with the experience of the moment."[106] That "human potential" Watson thought must not, however, be unlimited, as the "state can tolerate many things, but not intolerance," as the "world-state can tolerate many species of society, but not those which would destroy other states or those which would destroy the individuals who are their basis." [107] Watson rejected "social contract" theory, unable to "accept the proposition that individuals ultimately exist in an intelligible mode apart from the community."[108] Moreover, the "individualist theory which leads to a social contract analysis, in the end, is not merely wrong; it is also for Watson, immoral."[109] And yet, while "morality, in Watson's view, cannot be something imposed upon one from without in an arbitrary way" – morality "stems from one's rational consciousness of one's own nature" – it nonetheless derives from, or is somehow associated with, "a genuine theory of community."[110] Somehow the "state" must be rationally grounded; when it is "dependent on power and power itself [[it] is apt, in the end, to become a goal," that is, "the state, cut loose from reason, becomes an uncontrollable end in itself," a tendency "latent in the individualist social contract theories which preceded the writings of men like Nietzsche."[111]

For Watson "nationalism is in itself good so long, and only so long as it is recognized that no nation has a monopoly on merit and no nation is the final instantiation of the potentialities of the human being,"[112] as (quoting Watson) "each nation has its own task."[113] Watson postulated that "it is part of the general duty of societies to maintain their cultural structures insofar as they are rational structures."[114] (Is this a cultural theory of community, culture conceived as linked with that Godlike rationality that undergirds reality?) "For insofar as they have that property, each of them will perform a special function for men in general," [115] that term "special" specifying the provision of "conditions under which there is a reasonable chance for the best human capacities to develop."[116]

Given the use of "property" in that last sentence I'm unsure in what sense Armour and Trott intend the phrase "the right of *access* to property"[117] – something

Watson endorses - property as potential but also as real estate, as they later add his skepticism toward socialism – to that in a moment. They tell us that "he is arguing for what is commonly called 'equality of opportunity,' but that is not all; he is arguing that the community must actually provide the means which a citizen can "acquire property."[118] Despite the verb "acquire" implying real estate, here they must mean potential, as they write " the means might sometimes be education since education enables one to provide service for which others will trade property (Watson places the right to an education 'upon the same basis as the right to life and liberty'[119]), but even education is not enough."[120] Access to property – both potential and real estate (or material security generally?) also requires the "maintenance of conditions of industry and commerce in which the individual has a positive power to participate," if absent then "the state must intervene." [121] His skepticism toward socialism seems less theoretical than practical, as Armour and Trott tell us that in "highly complex industrial societies, he does not think that socialism, as he understood it, will work," as Watson thinks there is no "way of determining whether what one may have is exactly equal to or equivalent to what another man has," as "needs are relative to one's social condition and expectations," and "abilities are virtually impossible to assess."[122] (Tell that to the assessment industry.[123])

Watson thought "all societies have their quota of powerful Philistines,"[124] among whom are those who think the poor should be left to their poverty, a view Watson rejects, endorsing "all those kinds of public services which are likely to make possible a genuine sense of community."[125] Armour and Trott think that the "emphasis which he would put on public education – including the education of women – is forcefully ahead of its time," apparently forgetting their earlier notice of John Clark Murray."[126] Watson also had an "abiding distrust of power, a real fear of institutions which, though they can only represent one facet of the community, develop pretentious claims about their ability to represent the whole."[127] Armour and Trott report that Watson thought "persons are not discrete substances – whether material or spiritual – but rather individuations of a common system."[128] Rather than ontology, Watson focused on ethics, as Armour and Trott tell us that "in this way, Watson had a ready-made grounding for the notion of obligation," concluding: "If we derive our personalities from one another, it is ludicrous for us to suppose that we can, in the end, profit at one another's expense."[129] What if the personality one has derived from others is driven by greed?

Armour and Trott think that "someone with the temperament of Watson's old enemy Herbert Spencer or the temperament of Nietzsche might be willing to argue that it is the duty of great men to act in opposition to the community even if that means the destruction of the community because, whatever the metaphysical basis of personality might be, it is still necessary to take whatever risk might be needed in order to instantiate highest-order values,"[130] but one need not have either "temperament" - a touch reductive don't you think to reduce Spencer and Nietzsche to "temperament"?

– or community. Again, think of Arthur Miller's *The Crucible*. Some "communities" – Hamas for example - require destruction. But Watson – or at least Armour and Trott – are not thinking of witch trials or terrorist cells but of philosophical argument. They tell us that "Watson must, therefore, take on these arguments – by implication even if not overtly – in order to ground his system," as he wants to "find a basis for ethics which is not, *simply*, an extension of his metaphysics," asserting a "sense in which one must face ethical questions in their own right."[131]

Ethics does not rule out pleasure seeking; in fact "Watson attached great importance to hedonism itself," something he saw "at its simplest … [as] the "theory that the good consists of pleasure."[132] Indeed, the "English hedonists of the nineteenth century" – Armour and Trott cite Bentham,[133] Mill,[134] and Sidgwick[135] – all argued for an "ethical hedonism."[136]Armour and Trott suggest that "hedonism and utilitarianism seem naturally to go together,"[137] defining the latter as "the doctrine that acts are to be judged by their consequences."[138] One alternative to utilitarianism is "the doctrine that acts should be judged simply as acts and determined to be right or wrong independently of their consequences."[139] A second alternative is the view that "acts are to be judged by their intentions," and a "third alternative is that one ought to judge the motives of the act,"[140] although the distinction between "intentions" and "motives" isn't obvious. Honesty would seem to be an instance of that first alternative, as the "progress of science and the literary arts depends so obviously upon honesty and upon being in a community in which men act well that consequentialism generally appears irrelevant to such considerations," Armour and Trott adding: "The same is true, a fortiori, of good government."[141] If the progress of science and the literary arts "depends" on honesty, isn't "progress" a (possible) consequence of "honesty"? And would citizens judge their government as "good" if the "consequences" – economic but also social – weren't satisfactory? "At any rate" is right, as Armour and Trott reiterate that "hedonism and utilitarianism tended to go together and Watson confronted them, primarily, in the theories of Mill and Sidgwick."[142]

"What Watson wants to show," Armour and Trott continue, "is that, in every case, one must impose considerations about the nature of reason,"[143] Watson promising to show what a "theory of conduct is, or ought to be," and how it is "the exact counterpart and reflection of a theory of knowledge."[144] Next Watson argues that "Mill has given up the construction of a moral theory and fallen back on a piece of descriptive psychology which fails to describe anything which remotely amounts to a duty,"[145] a move Mill is said to have made that reflected *his* theory of knowledge. Never mind, as what Watson wants to ensconce is the primacy of "duty," pointing out that "one cannot tell from hedonist principles that one is under an *obligation* to produce pleasure for anyone."[146] While it's obvious, Armour and Trott continue, that "we *do* seek pleasures," for Watson it's "absurd to imagine that we *obliged* to."[147] Watson stays with his separation of "is" from "ought," writing (in Armour and Trott's words) that "we notice the unity in our experience but we also notice that unity cannot be derived

from an account of our immediate sensations," adding: "what Watson seems to want to say is that the unity in our experience is grasped in and through our attempts to make sense of that experience."[148] Armour and Trott conclude: "Morality for Watson seems, in the end, to be the acceptance of the commitment to reason which goes into the process of making sense of my own life."[149]

"Reason," Armour and Trott continue, "as something revealed through the development of experience as an orderly organizing pattern in that experience is, as we have seen, crucial to the whole of Watson's philosophy."[150] As an "individual … "what is important to me is not simple aggregation of pleasures but the development of a life which has a satisfactory and satisfying meaning to me,"[151] certainly the case for certain individuals but not everyone. Apparently conflating what "is" with what "ought to be," Armour and Trott continue: "I live in a community composed of other individuals who also want to give meanings to their lives and who hope to do so by developing a community which, itself, has a meaning to it," adding: "The sphere of moral inquiry is thus at once universalized and particularized."[152] (Not only the sphere of moral inquiry, but those of education, politics, culture, etc. are "at once universalized and particularized.") "The point that Watson has persistently been making," they summarize, "seems to be simply that, as we saw earlier, the utilitarian will have to move from a purely consequentialist standpoint to a position which involves judging more than consequences."[153] A student of philosophy might know why Watson belabored what seems to me an obvious point.

Armour and Trott Rather emphasize Watson's interest in how "reason is brought into play in the context of experience,"[154] one instance of which is deciding "which pleasures deserve our attention."[155] Another is "decid[ing] how to balance the consequences against the nature of the act."[156] Why "judgment" or "discernment" – with reason very much involved in each – didn't attract Watson's attention isn't obvious, but Armour and Trott tell us that what did attract Watson's attention is that: "All of this forces upon our attention the fact that the desires, goals, and so on which attract our attention are located in the context of a community or persons."[157] Community or what used to be termed "reference group"[158] are crucial of course, but also – recalling John Clark Murray – is the individual, and one's education, as "reason is capable of development."[159] Watson himself appears to acknowledge that, as reason has a (quoting Watson) "share in the constitution of subjects."[160] Maybe the majority of shares, as Armour and Trott write: "The ultimate reality is not, on the one hand, a collection of sensations and it is not, on the other hand, an abstract structure of rational principle. The ultimate reality is the intelligible."[161] But – again – what is intelligible depends in part upon the state of one's – our – reason.

It seems quite clear that Watson's basic moral point, therefore, is this: In searching for a rule to guide us, we must search for what is intelligible in itself. Our lives are unsuccessful, unsatisfying, and meaningless just in proportion to

the extent to which we cannot finally make sense of what goes on. Indeed, the worst human disasters are usually described by outsiders, if not by the immediate participants, as "senseless." War is senseless….[162]

Not everyone thinks so – including "outsiders" – and being capable of such reasoned judgement depends in part upon the state of one's reason, of one's state of mind, one's consciousness, one's character, one's very being. Apparently not so for Watson, as "the end of any rational human conduct must, as we read Watson, be a community in which the life of each participant contributes to the meaning of the life of every other participant," that because "the individual, apart from the community, is a meaningless notion."[163] They – does Watson? – go even further, declaring that the individual "is not, then, an individuation of anything," that one's community is key, and that "it must be a cooperative community."[164] Good luck with that. And never mind that this negation of individuation here (as "meaningless") contradicts Armour and Trott's earlier declaration that, for Watson, "self-identity" occurs "through the gradual individuation of myself against the background of a society."[165]

For Watson, "reason emerges in the context of experience," key here is not how (or that experience emerges in the context of reason, of what is intelligible – as Armour and Trott attribute to Watson: see above), but "context," as: "*In the context*, the question is one of how one can answer certain questions which are, in fact, pressing."[166] Of course discerning what is "pressing" is a matter of reasoned judgment – and the person capable of making it. Yes, community is key, but the person is primary: there is no community without the human subject. And note that the very concept of "context" implies a reality separable from the human subject, who in fact constructs the concept to spatialize reality. Paramount for Watson is reason; Watson was sceptical of "conventional understandings of reason" as he dwelled on "the relation of reason and experience as constitutive of the nature of reality."[167] Armour and Trott "try to bring them together – to show how Watson's account of reality grows out of his consideration of the sceptic's case, how he thought new understandings of reason could reconcile experience and rationality and make religion reasonable."[168] They alert us that, "along the way, we shall encounter William Caldwell, the McGill philosopher who sought to mediate between the Canadian idealists and the American pragmatists, and James Edwin Creighton, who was editor of the *Philosophical Review*."[169]

"From the beginning to the end of his career," Armour and Trott continue, "Watson invariably insisted that he was a 'speculative idealist'," noting that "idealism, however, is, on the whole, somewhat out of fashion."[170] Somewhat defensively, they assure us that: "At no time does he countenance 'subjective idealism,' the doctrine that what is ultimately real is my immediate awareness and the immediate awareness of others like," that he cannot "countenance subjective idealism for an obvious reason. It leads naturally to solipsism," the "doctrine that all I can really know to exist is my own immediate awareness," a doctrine that "is, he thinks, self-contradictory." [171]

Contradictory because "I do not know that I exist as an individual unless I can relate myself to something else."[172]Armour and Trott also assure us that "we also know that Watson does not hold any form of the so-called "spiritual substance" theory," as presumably "anything which was apparent to others would count as part of what we ordinarily think of as the 'material world'."[173] If not "spiritual substance" certainly abstraction – and not an entirely secular one at that – seeps through in that notion of "rational order," that which undergirds reality, including, apparently, our minds: "In general, everything he says is consistent with the view that what he means by mind is the notion of a rational order or, rather, a series of rational orders which interlock and intersect with one another," a view with which Armour and Trott quibble: "It is perhaps unfortunate that he chose to retain the word 'mind'."[174] I should have thought "rational order(s)" would be the more troubling term.

"What is less clear in Watson," Armour and Trott tell us, "is his theory of matter," noting that: "Customarily, an idealist is supposed to be someone who holds that matter is, in the end, 'unreal'."[175] Certainly, he would not, "as G.E. Moore seemed to think the idealist philosophers of the period did, want to deny the existence of matter."[176] Yet, Watson did not think that "material objects … as a class, [come] from the deepest level of ultimate reality," by which "he simply means to assert that material objects depend, for their existence, on something more ultimate."[177] Armour and Trott quote Watson: "I shall try to show that instead of thus reducing mind to matter, we must hold that matter is a form of mind."[178] Watson's "theory of matter seems, here, to be less Hegelian than his theory of mind," as "he wants it to correspond to the theory which he believes is endemic to modern science," namely that the "most basic of the sciences is physics," a field "concerned with successive distributions of material structures."[179] Whatever "change represented in these structures between any two moments of time is called motion."[180] The question of cause, he thought, was "simply the application of certain very general laws in such a way that the difference of structure at different moments of time is intelligible."[181] In other words, the concept of "cause" is "merely a synonym for a certain kind of explanation."[182]

On that last concept Armour and Trott dwell: "Now if one is going to explain things, as one really does in the sciences, by deploying a rational order to explain a succession of states of affairs, the rational order will be primary and the states of affairs will be derivative,"[183] a statement with which many scientists would disagree, but one which anticipates the philosophical research of Bruno Latour.[184] For Watson, Armour and Trott the rational order "is, indeed, the order *in* nature," no "Platonic universe somehow divorced from the appearances which ordinary men counter," but, "rather, it is the very order which appears in experience.[185] Such a "rational order, as such, is not temporal." [186] Watson disagreed with Bradley's belief "that reality is a trans-relational unity which simply surpasses the divided nature of all experience," as "order, for Watson, is always an order of something; though it is possible to have a structured, substantive order which is inherently non-temporal, a-temporal, or trans-temporal."[187]

It does, however, "take time for meaning in rational order to develop."[188] Meaning may "take time," but apparently Watson thought that "in each and every individual thought we transform and transcend time"[189] – again disagreeing with Bradley's belief that "the ultimate reality is unspeakable"[190] – indicating that "Watson is ultimately a rationalist and not an empiricist."[191] Indeed, Watson thought "that what links the inner world and the outer world is, indeed, a common principle of rational unity."[192] If experience "incoherence," we can "overcome" it by "constantly shifting the ground and content of our experience."[193]

Reality may be rationality but "what reality there is, is tinged with unreality," that is, "tinged with incoherence, incompleteness, and irrationality," all of which is embedded in "experience," as "experience is a process just because it does have, in Watson's view, an internal incoherence."[194] The rational order recedes even more in the sentence of Watson's Armour and Trott quote: "Man cannot be said to have been created either as good or evil, because morality exists only as willed by a rational subject."[195] Even "rationality is itself a creation,"[196] perhaps by God, as "some passages in Watson's Gifford Lectures suggest that God, Himself, is part of his development," but, in any case, "truth becomes a goal toward which we work,"[197] even though "truth *changes.*"[198] However elusive, "truth, like goodness itself, will then become an ideal – something to be attained and not something pre-existing."[199] What "becomes primary in the universe and central to truth" is "mind,"[200] a term you'll recall Armour and Trott earlier found "unfortunate." In fact mind "precede[s] matter," although "the more precise our accounts of matter become, the more precise, correspondingly, our minds become."[201] And "throughout "this process, time becomes transmuted as knowledge grows," specifically "it loses significance as there develop minds capable of moving freely throughout time and, as it loses significance, the truth changes."[202]

Recall that Armour and Trott also alerted us that we would meet William Caldwell, who (as they also mentioned earlier) "sought to bring together the insights of the pragmatists and the idealists of the time – an undertaking which was far from foolish in the light of Dewey's obvious and acknowledged debt to Hegelianism."[203] Armour and Trott tell us that Caldwell was "impressed by pragmatism partly because it seemed to him to provide a new and interesting perspective from which philosophical problems could be freshly viewed and partly because he was interested in it, as he says, as an exhibition of the American mind at work."[204] But he also considered "many of [William James'] formulations … vague, confusing, and, on their own ground, intellectually unsatisfying."[205] Moreover, he remained taken "with the British form of post-Hegelian idealism," attempting in his book - *Pragmatism and Idealism* - to "reconcile the insights of these two views."[206] Armour and Trott treat Caldwell's book as "one of the very few major incursions of American pragmatism into Canadian thought,"[207] assuming that Canadians read Caldwell. We are told that "Watson thought little of Caldwell's effort but revealed something of himself in the process of responding to it."[208]

James Edwin Creighton was born April 8, 1861 in Pictou, Nova Scotia; he studied at Dalhousie, then "followed Schurman to Cornell where he was first graduate student and then faculty member until his death in 1924." [209] They tell us that "Creighton's work is dominated by two ideas," namely that (1) the history of philosophy is an essential part of philosophy itself" – I likewise insist the intellectual history of curriculum studies is an "essential part" of curriculum studies itself – and (2) that "philosophy is a social not an individual process,"[210] an obviously false idea, as philosophy is – as is all intellectual endeavour – simultaneously social and individual. After all, this research brief is mostly about John Watson, a singular individual, how socially embedded. Armour and Trott play along with Creighton: "If philosophy grows by an historical process of the interchange of views and is intelligible only in a context, then one might well suppose that, at any moment in time, it is also true that philosophy will make sense only in a social context," adding: "One man alone has little occasion to philosophize: it is only when he has inherited a set of challenges and finds a variety of position in his immediate life that he must philosophize."[211] Those three words return us to the indisputable but somehow unfashionable fact that there are individuals, human beings, persons. Social of course, but solitary as well.

Creighton's career – as teacher, editor, and friend of activist philosophers - seemed a "natural and proper one," one that followed neatly his view of what philosophy is. [212] Echoing the idea that the person is simultaneously social and individual is the concept of "concrete universal," what Creighton considered to be "the most important post-Kantian philosophical artefact."[213] Armour and Trott define this concept - the "concrete universal" - as "that perfected individual through which the generalizations which enable us to theorize about the world become intelligible."[214] Creighton considered the "task of the philosopher as mainly that of clarifying the university," a task Armour and Trott tell us he and Watson shared, if Watson narrowed the challenge to "respond[ing] to the details of various sceptical attacks" while "Creighton thought that that task was more positive: it was to work out the details of the concrete universal, to show how something can be both real (and so individual) and also amenable to reason (and so compounded of universals from which generalizations can be made)."[215] Not that they argued over that; in fact "Watson did not often indulge in philosophical skirmishes with his contemporaries," as those "with whom he skirmished mostly belonged to history."[216] And evidently those skirmishes required not only philosophical but historiographic sophistication as well, as Watson appreciated that: "To get at the roots of an idea in a way which will enable one to come genuinely come to grips with it, one must have seen it at work through twists and turns of time."[217] That recalls Creighton's call to include the history of philosophy in the study of philosophy.

Skirmishes there were, however, and in one Watson criticized Caldwell. In two articles published in a 1914 issue of the *Queen's Quarterly*, Watson critiqued Caldwell's recently published book *Pragmatism and Idealism*. Also in this issue, Watson expressed

suspicion of "even of the compromises admitted by Bernard Bosanquet in *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*."[218] His main adversary, however, was neither Creighton nor Bosanquet but William James,[219] concerned Watson was "to protect theology against James's forays into its domain," but also concerned "with the Jamesian account of experience," as "James accuses the absolute idealists in general of falling victim to the illicit reification of attractive abstractions."[220] Armour and Trott explain that "James did not doubt that there was order in experience," but he allowed that "order in experience might take many forms, that reality was not an effective unity or, at least, that such a unity could not be the exclusive basis of effective belief, and that experience must continue to surprise us."[221]

"Watson wants to argue that, in the occasions of experience which rise from transactions of the world, we are constantly faced with features which go beyond their immediacy,"[222] a view James (at least in the Armour and Trott summary of it in the last sentence of the paragraph just above) would only partially dispute. Surprisingly, Armour and Trott associate Watson's with "the phenomenology of meaning" in the sense that "pieces of experience are meaningful because they refer beyond themselves and, because they are meaningful, we can understand more than they immediately offer."[223] That "meaning" isn't primarily personal, or even personal at all, a conclusion I reach when I read that "these snatches of meaning give us a clue to the manner in which we may find rational whole which will explain the part."[224] Watson thinks James was taking the (quoting Watson) "plunge into the abyss of phenomenalism, where we meet with nothing but the elusive fictions of an unintelligible universe," a move that means (again quoting Watson): "The universe as known to us is, on his [James's] showing, utterly incomprehensible, and we must therefore abandon all the normal processes of reason and take refuge in a mystical faith."[225] Without "reason," left with a radical disjuncture between the empirical world and what transcends it, Watson accused James of taking refuge in the "feeling" that we are all part of the "larger consciousness"[226] (Watson's words) which is, "ultimately a finite God."[227] But "if Watson were prepared to found his metaphysics on ethics and to call his metaphysics rational preference," Armour and Trott point out, "he would be quite close to James," and "Watson comes quite close to that very position," as "he would admit that men habitually live out their lives in a world which is not, in is terms, the real world."[228] Armour and Trott do conclude, however, that "Watson does believe that, at bottom, there is a univocal description of things and James does not."[229]

Unsurprising then, to read "religion fascinated Watson all his life,"[230] that "it was always Watson's intention, deliberately, to create a rational religion is beyond the possibility of doubt."[231] Armour and Trott note that Watson started his "Gifford Lectures with an account of religion, claiming that religion and the nature of man as essentially spiritual were closely bound," going on "to insist that religion, far from being the enemy of rationality, is the natural outcome of rationality."[232] While Watson recognized "that religion has functions which transcend those of the intellect,"[233] he

emphasizes that (quoting Watson):"So far as he is religious, man is raised above the divisions and distractions of his ordinary consciousness, and attains to peacefulness and serenity."[234] That it also led to residential schools, genocide and mass violence – I'm thinking of the Crusades, of the mass slaughter of Indigenous peoples in North, Central, and South America and never mind the enslavement of Africans – but apparently Watson was focused on its "obviously practical outcome," those "feeling states" of peacefulness and serenity … [that] in Watson's view, were not to be distinguished from rationality."[235] In Armour and Trott's judgement, "Watson's blend of hard-headed rationality and other-worldliness was exactly the commodity that the market demanded." [236] They then assert that "it is important, as part of the understanding of Canadian culture, to ask how successful Watson was in creating the synthesis that he wanted – the synthesis that would make religion rational but retain its solace."[237]

"Watson holds consistently that the rational element in one's life *is* what shapes one's actions," that "there is not a dual reality of idea and act."[238] Armour and Trott locate the "origins" of Watson's theory in Kant, reminding us that Watson had been "a serious Kant scholar all his life."[239] One need not doubt their assertion to note that apparently Watson diverged from Kant[240] in arguing that "God, if he exists, belongs to a domain in which the writ of reason, as we know it, simply does not run."[241] Contra that earlier skepticism toward the "individual," Armour and Trott tell us as an "empirical ego, each of us is a different creature," but "what pure practical reason puts us in touch with is the noumenal self - the underlying of reality."[242] And it is that "noumenal self,"[243] that "world that the moral agent, per se, has its being."[244] There are, of course, other worlds as well: "Nature exhibits, for Watson and Hegel, universals as much as morality does."[245] For neither of them, however, is it the case that in nature or in that world underlying "reality" is this "universal element … an abstraction."[246] Asserting that "this is the real point," Armour and Trott continue: "The universal, for Hegel and for Watson, is only comprehensible as an ordered set of actual things," meaning that "it is concrete in the sense that we must represent it to ourselves and our physical laws as an order of natural objects."[247] In fact, "we cannot understand that order apart from the objects or vice versa."[248]

Armour and Trott go on to report that Watson "claims that religion exhibits three phases – a phase in which God is immediately experienced as present in nature, a phase in which God is exhibited in the moral order, and a phase in which we meet religion as (quoting Watson) 'spirit in its concrete fullness'."[249] About nature they quote Watson again: "Nature is not something which simply stands alongside of man, but its processes are in harmony with the ends of the self-conscious life."[250] Evidently "self-conscious life" doesn't include the reduction of "nature" to "resources," as Armour and Trott translate Watson into saying:

The more we attempt to bend nature to some inner impulse, the more we distort nature and, ultimately, destroy ourselves. From once we are cut off from the ultimate rational order, we project ourselves into a self-made nothingness. Thus the contrast creates a responsibility in us. We use nature, but we must use nature in the name of the rational order which we have in common with nature. In seeing this, we see that our moral commitments are not simply private but something which we share with all participants in the rational order. Thus we come to see God as within it…. properly grasped, an analysis of our inner states leads us to nature and an analysis of nature leads back to us.[251]

Sounds circular to me. And dualistic, Armour and Trott conclude (quoting Watson at the end of the following sentence): "Hence in his religious life man does not withdraw into himself, but 'lives in the world though not of it.'"[252] Armour and Trott continue: "Put another way, reason leads us to God but the understanding of the nature of God leads us back to ourselves."[253] Okay, intentionally circular, but what Armour and Trott conclude is: "Here we have, if anywhere, a religion of pure reason."[254]

"There is what he [Watson] calls an 'invisible church' and this church represents the spirit of goodness so far as it exists in all the forms of social organization," that "invisible church" – the rational order underlying, infusing reality - both "concrete and manifest according to the abilities of men to grasp its nature."[255] Sounds developmental to this educator's ears, but also moral, as the "divine appears wherever morality, the spirit of goodness, appears."[256] Moreover, the "invisible church can have no binding creed and any visible church that seeks to have one must be resisted in its claims to universality."[257] Why? "If freedom gives way to compulsion," Armour and Trott explain, "the rational order cannot, ultimately, avail itself, for compulsion seeks to impose the understanding of the moment and reason must always be its guide," and so "organized religion, if not carefully monitored, is itself a peril."[258] Watson allowed that "religion requires some ritual but he insists, again, that the 'invisible church; cannot 'have a fixed and unchanging ritual'."[259] Watson went on to write that: "As its fundamental principle is the essential identity of the human and divine natures, any symbolical acts which are fitted to body forth this truth may be employed as a means of educating the young and reminding the nature of this central idea," but "we must not overlook the danger that besets all forms of ceremonial – the danger that, while in their first institution they are of service in symbolizing the life of the spirit, they may degenerate into a dead and lifeless routine."[260] Watson supposes that we may be protected from this danger partly (Watson's words again) "by contemplating the total sphere of art as the only perfectly adequate symbolism of the invisible church."[261] "Here," Armour and Trott explain, "he attacks the partisans of particular symbolisms."[262]

Watson allows that "religion requires faith," but faith is "not the belief in irrational propositions," which he regards as "mere superstition."[263] Faith, for Watson,

is "what converts belief into action," as "action" – which is "the bringing about of an unknown" – "involves the faith that the best rational proposition one has been able to assemble will, in fact, hold true after a given act of creation."[264] Because "irrationality is itself the manifestation of unreality," it "must eventually perish."[265] Faith also involves "faith in ourselves," at least insofar that "we identify ourselves with God by becoming developed examples of our own fundamental rationality."[266] Therefore, faith – religion itself – "*is* the process of the transformation of feeling into reason."[267] That "transformation of feeling into reason" – akin to translating the preconceptual into the conceptual in phenomenology – is what poets do, what many intellectuals (including curriculum theorists) do. Armour and Trott turn to a more organizational than philosophical project (although they imply the two intertwine, as organization involves "action"), as "Watson, here, is evidently seeking to carry out the project which continuously preoccupied Canadian intellectuals from the first, tentative prospects of church union."[268] They point out that as "church union came about" – they are referring to the establishment of the United Church of Canada [269] – "sectarian bitterness faded," even though clergymen of the United Church provided a spectrum of belief and practice."[270] "Like Watson," Armour and Trott point out, "they believed that faith was a matter of action and they provided a vast variety of public services at home and abroad."[271] During the Great Depression,[272] the United Church provided programmes for social change and much of the driving force behind the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation[273] and even its successor, the New Democratic Party."[274]

The decline of the United Church of Canada[275] Armour and Trott appear to attribute to Watson's declining influence. They postulate no simple cause and effect, but they do wonder "if the United Church had remained more firmly committed to the philosophies of men like Watson, it would have increased rather than slackened its hold on the rising generation," but the Church was unable to "do this because universities were no longer staffed by men like Watson." [276] Alas, Canadian "philosophy departments came to be staffed by young men, imported from the United States and England, who had no interest in such theories or in the kinds of problems with which Watson was concerned," and thus "there was no successor to the 'Watsonian' generation of the 1930s." [277] Armour and Trott lament: "Whether, as Canadians increasingly look to their own traditions, all this will change and Watson's rational religion will, once again, become at least an object of interest is something which cannot be predicted."[278] Oh – I'm afraid it can. There's no going back.

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ENDNOTES

[1] 1981, 216. For those unfamiliar with the geography of Kingston and the Queen's University campus, the "lake" is Lake Ontario.

[2] Ibid. See research brief #107.

[3] Ibid. For more or Caird see: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Edward-Caird

[4] Ibid. The University of California at Berkeley remains one of the world's most prestigious universities: https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2023/world-ranking For more on Royce: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/royce/

[5] Quoted in 1981, 216.

[6] 1981, 216.

[7] Ibid.

[8] 1981, 217.

[9] Ibid.

[10] https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/constitution-act-1867

[11] 1981, 217.

[12] Ibid. Concerning communitarianism: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/communitarianism/ Concerning the United Church of Canada: https://united-church.ca/

[13] Ibid.

[14] We're all about embodiment now. See, for example, Snowber 2016, 2017, 2022.

[15] 1981, 217.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid. On Caird see endnote #3. Concerning T.H. Green, see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/green/

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] 1981, 218.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid. For more on Bradley, see: https://www.britannica.com/biography/F-H-Bradley For more on Bosanquet, see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bosanquet/

[24] Ibid.

[25] 1981, 219.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid. Concerning David Hume, see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume/

[30] 1981, 220.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] 1981, 221.

34 Ibid. This line of thinking evokes Jacob Gould Schurman's thinking that even the theory of evolution implies the existence of God (see research brief #108).

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 1981, 221-222.

39 1981, 222.

40 https://search.yahoo.com/yhs/search;_ylt=AwrOqmZC8VBlA.8nTR0PxQt.;_ylc=X1MDMjExNDcwMDU1OQRfcgMyBGZyA3locy10cm8tZnJlc2h5BGZyMgNzYi10b3AEZ3ByaWQeTVuRUQ5cC5UQmkzUUIzSEYySG5lQQRuX3JzbHQDMARuX3N1Z2cDMARvcmlnaW4Dc2VhcmNoLnlhaG9vLmNvbQRwb3MDMARwcXN0cgMEcHFzdHJsAzAEcXN0cmwDMzYEcXVlcnkDY29uY2VwdCUyMG9mJTIwZ3Jvd3RoJTIwaW4lMjBlZHVjYXRpb24lMjB0aG9yeQR0X3N0bXADMTY5OTgwMzQ4OQ--?p=concept+of+growth+in+education+thory&fr2=sb-top&hspart=tro&hsimp=yhs-freshy&type=Y219_F163_204671_071321

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid. Concerning D.G. Richie, see: http://www.scottishphilosophy.org/philosophers/david-george-ritchie/

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 1981, 224.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid. "Depends" seems to contract that earlier (for me crucial) sentence (quoted earlier in this same paragraph): that "self" identity occurs "through the gradual individuation of myself *against* the background of a society" (italics added). Thompson (2022, 214) puts it this way: "What the rational self comes to realize is that he or she must think in more socially mediated terms. We do not, therefore, abandon the concept of the self; we enrich and expand it."

53 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/ For its import in curriculum studies, see Pinar et al. 1995, 404-449.

54 Ibid.

55 1981, 225.

56 Quoted in 1981, 225.

57 1981, 225. Relying on the Amour-Trott treatment of Schurman (research brief #108), I didn't think Schurman isolated the "divine Prius from the process of the

world," instead, he argued that the "process of the world" implied the existence of absolute consciousness, the two being necessarily (if perhaps inscrutably) interrelated.

[58] 1981, 228.

[59] 1981, 229.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Ibid.

[63] 1981, 230.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid. Concerning Cartesianism: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Cartesianism

[66] 1981, 231.

[67] 1981, 232.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid.

[72] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/

[73] Ibid.

[74] 1981, 232

[75] Quoted in 1981, 233.

[76] 1981, 233.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Ibid.

[79] 1981, 233-234.

[80] 1981, 234.

[81] Quoted in 1981, 234.

[82] 1981, 234.

[83] 1981, 235. For more on Treitschke see: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Heinrich-von-Treitschke

[84] Ibid.

[85] Ibid.

[86] 1981, 236.

[87] Ibid.

[88] Ibid.

[89] https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9780203836033-20/subjective-social-reconstruction-william-pinar

[90] Pinar 2019a, 126-127.

[91] 1981, 236.

[92] Ibid.

[93] 1981, 237.

[94] Ibid.

[95] As Halpern (2023, November 2, 62) notes: "Rights do not protect us from ourselves if we are willing to waive them."

[96] 1981, 238.

[97] Quoted in 1981, 238.

[98] 1981, 238.

[99] Quoted in 1981, 238.

[100] 1981, 238.

[101] 1981, 239.

[102] Ibid.

[103] Quoted in 1981, 239.

[104] 1981, 239.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Ibid.

[107] 1981, 240.

[108] 1981, 241. Concerning social contract theory, see: https://www.britannica.com/topic/social-contract

[109] Ibid. Given his earlier affirmation of the individual, the "individualism" Watson is rejecting here must be akin to what Macpherson would later specify as "possessive individualism." See: https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/34715/chapter-abstract/296450019?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=false

[110] 1981, 242.

[111] 1981, 243.

[112] 1981, 245.

[113] Quoted in 1981, 245.

[114] 1981, 245-246.

[115] 1981, 246.

[116] 1981, 246-247.

[117] 1981, 247.

[118] Ibid.

[119] Quoted in 1981, 247.

[120] 1981, 247.

[121] Ibid.

[122] 1981, 248.

[123] PISA is one prominent offender: https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/overview.asp

[124] Ibid.

[125] Ibid.

[126] See research brief #107.

[127] 1981, 248.

[128] 1981, 249.

[129] Ibid.

130 Ibid.

131 1981, 250.

132 Ibid.

133 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bentham/

134 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill/

135 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sidgwick/

136 Ibid.

137 1981, 251.

138 1981, 250.

139 1981, 250-251.

140 1981, 251. Intention is defined as an "aim" or a "plan," and motive is "the reason for doing something." Two different terms but intersecting meanings, as an "aim" can be construed as "the reason for doing something."

141 1981, 252.

142 Ibid.

143 1981, 254.

144 Quoted in 1981, 255.

145 1981, 259.

146 1981, 260.

147 Ibid.

148 1981, 261.

149 Ibid.

150 Ibid.

151 1981, 262.

152 Ibid.

153 1981, 263.

154 1981, 265.

155 1981, 266.

156 Ibid.

157 Ibid.

158 https://www.sociologygroup.com/reference-group/

159 1981, 175; quoted in research brief #107.

160 Quoted in 1981, 266.

161 1981, 266.

162 Ibid. I am writing while the Israeli retaliatory invasion of Gaza and Russia's invasion of Ukraine emphasize that last point.

163 Ibid.

164 Ibid.

165 1981, 224. Quoted earlier in this brief.

166 1981, 267.

167 1981, 269.

168 Ibid.

169 Ibid. Regarding Caldwell: https://archivalcollections.library.mcgill.ca/index.php/caldwell-william-1881-1942 Regarding Creighton: https://www.britannica.com/biography/James-Edwin-Creighton

170 Ibid. For a recent example, perhaps accenting the "somewhat" in the Armour-Trott sentence, see Gabriel and Žižek 2009.

171 1981, 270.

172 Ibid.

173 1981, 271. The term "apparent" would seem to allow some version of spirituality, as many apprehend the presence of God in their lives. See, for instance, Orisi 2016.

174 Ibid.

175 Ibid.

176 1981, 272. Regarding G.E. Moore: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore/

177 Ibid.

178 Ibid. In our time, mind is a form of matter; the concept of brain predominates: https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/08/25/1031432/what-is-mind-brain-body-connection/

179 1981, 273.

180 Ibid.

181 1981, 274.

182 1981, 275.

183 1981, 276.

184 https://www.britannica.com/biography/Bruno-Latour

185 1981, 278.

186 Ibid.

187 Ibid.

188 1981, 279.

189 1981, 280.

190 1981, 280-281.

191 1981, 283.

192 1981, 285.

193 Ibid.

194 1981, 286.

195 Quoted in 1981, 287.

196 1981, 288.

197 1981, 289.

198 1981, 288. Talk about moving the goal posts….

199 1981, 290.

200 Ibid.

201 Ibid.

202 Ibid.

203 1981, 291.

204 Ibid. As if there were one American mind – or one Canadian mind.

205 Ibid.

206 Ibid.

207 1981, 300.

208 Ibid.

209 Ibid.

210 1981, 292.

211 Ibid.

212 Ibid.

213 Ibid.

214 1981, 292. Perfected? Good luck with that.

215 Ibid.

216 1981, 293.

217 Ibid.

218 1981, 294.

219 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/james/

220 1981, 295. Armour and Trott (1981, 295) think that "Watson seems to read James, rather unfairly, as being himself the victim of an abstraction."

221 Ibid.

222 1981, 297.

223 Ibid.

224 Ibid. I am reminded of Grant's attunement to the Good (Pinar 2019b, 230).

225 Quoted in 1981, 297.

226 Quoted in 1981, 297-298.

227 1981, 298.

228 Ibid.

229 1981, 299.

230 1981, 300.

231 1981, 302.

232 Ibid.

233 Ibid.

234 Quoted in 1981, 302.

235 1981, 302.

236 Ibid. Can't help but comment on the odd use of "commodity" here, a term bespeaking of a materialism antithetical to religion.

237 1981, 303.

238 1981, 304.

239 Ibid.

240 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-religion/

241 1981, 306. This view seems more in line with Kierkegaard's: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kierkegaard/#Faith

242 1981, 307.

243 https://www.britannica.com/topic/noumenon See also: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/

244 1981, 307.

245 1981, 310.

246 Ibid.

247 Ibid.

248 Ibid.

249 1981, 314.

250 Quoted in 1981, 315.

251 1981, 315.

252 Ibid.

253 1981, 316.

254 Ibid.

255 1981, 317.

256 Ibid.

257 Ibid.

258 Ibid.

259 Ibid.

260 Quoted in 1981, 317-318.

261 Quoted in 1981, 318.

262 1981, 318.

263 Ibid.

264 Ibid.

265 Ibid.

266 Ibid.

267 1981, 319.

268 Ibid.

269 https://united-church.ca/community-and-faith/welcome-united-church-canada/history-united-church-canada

270 1981, 319.

271 Ibid.

272 https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/great-depression

273 https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/co-operative-commonwealth-federation

274 1981, 319. Regarding the New Democratic Party: https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/new-democratic-party

275 https://canadianchristianity.com/study-predicts-united-church-decline-continue-696/

276 1981, 320.

277 Ibid. Intellectual continuity is one casualty of modernity's – and post-modernity's – obsessions with "the new," counter movements to which there are many, including the great George Grant as I document: Pinar 2019b. The CSinC project is a (very) modest instance of the same.

278 Ibid.